Recently looked at several DAO proposals, on the surface they are written quite "for the good of the community," but when it comes to the incentive section, it gets a bit subtle: who receives subsidies, who gets nominated, who has the veto power—all of these are actually pushing power toward fixed individuals or small circles. To put it plainly, voting isn't about right or wrong; it's about accepting a certain distribution method. Many people just look at the APR and click agree, and then it's hard to change later.

These days, funding fee rates are being flooded across screens again. People are arguing whether to reverse or continue squeezing the bubble. I actually think the same psychology applies to governance: when emotions run high, it's easier to give the green light to "stimulus" proposals, only to realize later that the cost is long-term.

For my part, I take an extra step for safety: before voting, I at least read through the execution permissions and fund flow lines, and if I can check on-chain, I also look up who the multisig signers are; it's a bit troublesome, but better than cursing in the group afterward... Anyway, I’m the kind of person who prefers not to act if I don’t have to.