Why does Iran prefer stablecoins as the currency for passage through the Strait of Hormuz?

Written by: Chainalysis

Translated by: AididiaoJP, Foresight News

Summary

Bloomberg reported on April 1, 2026, that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps of Iran has begun collecting transit tolls from ships passing through the Strait of Hormuz. Shipping operators negotiate fees with Iran, typically starting at about one dollar per barrel of oil, payable in RMB or stablecoins, through an intermediary associated with the Revolutionary Guard and a licensing system. Subsequently, a report by The Financial Times cited a spokesperson from the Iran Petroleum, Gas, and Petrochemical Products Exporters Association, stating that during ceasefire periods, shipping companies passing through the Strait of Hormuz will be required to pay a toll of one dollar per barrel in cryptocurrency.

Although the statement specifically mentions Bitcoin, we speculate that Iran will prioritize stablecoins over Bitcoin when collecting such fees, aligning with the regime’s long-standing pattern of heavily relying on stablecoins for illegal trade and sanctions evasion.

This latest development extends the expanding crypto footprint of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. According to sanctions designations by the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control, the U.S. National Counterterrorism Center’s seizure list, and leaked data on the Central Bank of Iran addresses, the Revolutionary Guard’s crypto activities accounted for about half of Iran’s total crypto ecosystem in Q4 2025, involving billions of dollars in transactions.

Shipping companies paying tolls for passage through the Strait of Hormuz face significant sanctions risk exposure, as Iran is under comprehensive sanctions by the U.S. and the international community. This generally means that companies must obtain specific licenses or approvals from relevant authorities before transacting with sanctioned entities or jurisdictions.

As the situation develops, regulators, law enforcement, and stablecoin issuers must work to identify wallets controlled by the Revolutionary Guard and their counterparties, and freeze illicit assets.

The New Frontier of National-Level Cryptocurrency Applications

Bloomberg reported on April 1, 2026, that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps of Iran has begun collecting transit tolls from ships seeking safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz. Shipping operators are required to process through an intermediary linked to the Revolutionary Guard, submitting detailed information about the vessel’s ownership, flag, cargo, destination, and crew. Fees—usually starting at about one dollar per barrel of oil, payable in RMB or stablecoins—are negotiated in exchange for a license code and a route under escort, known in the industry as the “Iran Toll Station.”

Subsequently, a report by The Financial Times on April 8, 2026, citing Hamid Hosseini, a spokesperson for the Iran Petroleum, Gas, and Petrochemical Products Exporters Association—an industry group closely cooperating with the state—stated that tankers must notify Iranian authorities of their cargo via email, after which Iran will inform them of the toll amount payable in “digital currency.” He specifically mentioned Bitcoin, noting that tankers will have “a few seconds to complete the payment in Bitcoin to ensure it cannot be tracked or seized due to sanctions.”

If implemented, this would mark a significant milestone: the first known instance of a sovereign nation requiring cryptocurrency payments for international waterways transit fees. Beyond the immediate crisis, Tehran’s move sets a dangerous precedent for future international commercial activities. If successful, this mechanism could serve as a proof of concept, easily emulated by other heavily sanctioned actors, and replicated across other critical maritime choke points and strategic arteries in global trade.

While the concept sounds novel, it aligns entirely with Iran’s well-documented and rapidly expanding pattern of leveraging cryptocurrencies—especially stablecoins—to facilitate large-scale trade of weapons, oil, and commodities.

Why We Expect Stablecoins Instead of Bitcoin

Hosseini’s remarks explicitly mention Bitcoin, and this choice appears logical on the surface: Bitcoin is fully decentralized and cannot be frozen by the issuer, unlike stablecoins such as USDT. However, based on our in-depth analysis of Iran’s on-chain behavior, we speculate that if this plan is implemented, stablecoins will ultimately be the preferred tool for large-scale toll collection.

Historically, Iran’s regime has relied on stablecoins because they are pegged to the dollar, ensuring store-of-value functionality and providing the liquidity needed for large-scale applications. As the Iranian rial plummets and the economy remains in crisis, the regime’s dependence on stablecoins has taken on greater strategic significance. In contrast, Bitcoin experiences regular price volatility. Since Bitcoin has no issuer and cannot be seized or frozen by intermediaries, it is mainly used by Iranian cyber actors for ransomware ransom payments and supporting malicious cyber activities. This is a vastly different scenario from the large-scale, commercial-oriented fund flows involved in collecting tolls through the Strait of Hormuz.

Existing records show that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ on-chain activities—covering oil sales, weapons procurement, and proxy funding—largely rely on stablecoins as the transaction medium. The Strait of Hormuz is one of the world’s most critical choke points, with about 20% of global oil and liquefied natural gas transported through it. Given that current Persian Gulf tankers carry approximately 175 million barrels of crude and refined oil, even collecting tolls on a portion of this oil could provide the regime with urgently needed revenue amid its most severe threats in decades.

The Revolutionary Guard’s Crypto Empire: Billions on Chain

To understand why tolls paid in cryptocurrency for passage through the Strait of Hormuz are a logical next step for Iran’s regime, one must grasp the scale and sophistication of the Guard’s current on-chain operations.

As we documented earlier this year in our analysis of Iran’s $7.8 billion crypto ecosystem, the Revolutionary Guard’s on-chain activities have been steadily growing, accounting for about half of Iran’s total crypto ecosystem by Q4 2025. Funds received by addresses associated with the Guard exceeded $2 billion in 2024 and surged past $3 billion in 2025. These figures are conservative estimates, covering only addresses identified through OFAC sanctions designations and the U.S. National Counterterrorism Center’s seizure list, not including shell companies, financial intermediaries, and other wallets controlled by the Guard.

Impact of Sanctions on Shipping

For the global shipping industry, Iran’s crypto tolls pose significant compliance risks. Iran is under comprehensive U.S. sanctions, meaning U.S. persons and entities are prohibited from engaging in nearly all transactions involving the Iranian government, its agencies, and tools. Shipping companies seeking passage through the Strait of Hormuz that pay in cryptocurrency or any other form to Iran could face severe penalties. Moreover, in a fragile ceasefire environment, not all oil companies, shippers, and multinational corporations may be prepared to transport and insure cargo through this strait.

Typically, companies must seek specific licenses or approvals from the U.S. Treasury to transact with sanctioned entities or conduct trade within sanctioned jurisdictions. Making payments in cryptocurrency without such authorization could constitute a sanctions violation, exposing firms to enforcement actions, fines, and reputational damage, as it may provide material support for Iran’s war efforts and proxy groups across the region.

This use of cryptocurrency instead of traditional fiat does not alter the sanctions impact. However, the inherent transparency of blockchain allows regulators and compliance teams to track fund flows in near real-time, helping identify entities interacting directly or indirectly with sanctioned wallets.

Looking Ahead: Opportunities for Disruption

Continuously identifying and verifying addresses associated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps remains critical. Each addition to the sanctions list and seizure list further maps the Guard’s on-chain infrastructure, making it increasingly difficult for the regime to access mainstream liquidity.

Opportunities for disruption span both public and private sectors:

Stablecoin issuers can technically freeze assets identified as controlled or associated with the IRGC or other sanctioned entities. If, as we suspect, Iran indeed uses stablecoins to collect tolls for the Strait of Hormuz, this would constitute a direct intervention point.

Law enforcement can leverage blockchain intelligence to trace toll payments back through the Revolutionary Guard’s money laundering infrastructure, potentially identifying new nodes and cash-out points within the network.

Regulators should continue to publicly identify and verify IRGC wallets, expanding the known boundaries of Iran’s on-chain activities.

Exchanges, financial institutions, and compliance teams should monitor risk exposures related to Iran services and Guard-controlled wallets, especially considering that this new toll mechanism could introduce new fund flows into the mainstream crypto ecosystem.

As Iran continues integrating cryptocurrencies into its national financial operations—from oil sales and proxy financing to maritime tolls—blockchain analysis will be vital for maintaining visibility over these flows, enabling the international community to mitigate risks and generate actionable intelligence.