GF Securities: The Wosh Era Outlook — Three Shifts in the Federal Reserve's Policy Framework

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Source: Guo Lei Macroeconomic Tea Room

Chen Jiali, Senior Macroeconomic Analyst at 广发 Securities

Abstract

First, on January 30, 2026, Trump announced that he would nominate Wosh to serve as the next Chair of the Federal Reserve, replacing Powell; Powell’s term as Chair will end in May. In the statement, Trump reviewed Wosh’s professional background and claimed that Wosh would become “one of the greatest Fed chairmen in history” (he will go down as one of the great Fed chairmen), and that “he will never let you down” (he will never let you down). The nomination still requires confirmation through the Senate Banking Committee hearing and a full vote.

Second, Wosh’s resume is extremely diverse. He has hands-on experience across Wall Street M&A, White House economic policy work, and crisis response at the Federal Reserve. He served as an Executive Director at Morgan Stanley responsible for M&A from 1995 to 2002, and is familiar with how Wall Street operates; from 2002 to 2006, he was a Special Assistant for Economic Policy to the White House and Executive Secretary of the National Economic Council. From 2006 to 2011, he served as a Federal Reserve Governor. During the 2008 global financial crisis, he was the chief liaison between the Federal Reserve and Wall Street and also served as a representative to the G20. In 2011, he resigned in opposition to the second round of quantitative easing (QE2), arguing that such large-scale purchases of bonds would distort markets and could lead to severe inflation and looser fiscal discipline in the future. After leaving the Federal Reserve, Wosh became a Senior Visiting Scholar at the Hoover Institution of Stanford University, and he is also a partner at the Duqun Family Office.

Third, in terms of how he understands growth, Wosh belongs to the supply-side school. He believes the U.S. economy is below its potential growth rate not because aggregate demand is insufficient, but because inefficient capital allocation and tighter regulation suppress the supply side. He believes the Federal Reserve currently underestimates the resilience of the U.S. economy in its understanding of potential growth, and further overlooks the nonlinear growth potential brought by technological change. Wosh believes the U.S. economy is experiencing an AI-driven productivity boom. If the annual labor productivity growth rate can be raised by 1 percentage point, living standards could double within a single generation, and it would not bring inflation.

Fourth, in terms of how he understands inflation, Wosh views inflation as the Federal Reserve’s main responsibility (Fed is chiefly responsible), not as a passive result of external shocks—that is, inflation is a choice (inflation is a choice). He believes that during the high-inflation period of the past few years, the Federal Reserve attributing inflation to external factors was a form of “passing the blame,” directly negating the logic in the Powell era that 2021–2022 inflation was driven by supply chains and the Russia-Ukraine conflict. We understand that under Wosh’s framework, the Federal Reserve will not excuse cost-push inflation. If tariffs or supply shocks push up prices, his reaction function is more likely to tighten than to wait and see—sharply contrasting with the “transitory inflation” narrative from the Powell era.

第五，在对利率政策的理解上，沃什历史上的公开表态整体偏鹰派，但特朗普多次表示沃什支持降息。基于沃什的学术主张和近期言论，我们倾向于认为其政策取向将支持渐进式降息。其核心逻辑在于以供给侧框架重新评估美联储政策路径，即降息不是为了平抑需求，而是为了适应供给。沃什认为，传统菲利普斯曲线所描述的失业率与通胀间的负相关关系已趋于失效，AI驱动的生产率跃升正在重塑美国经济的潜在产出边界，使得经济在维持强劲增长的同时不必然触发通胀压力，从而为维持较低利率水平提供了政策空间。这一框架与特朗普降低融资成本的政策诉求高度契合。

第六，在对货币政策和财政政策关系的理解上，沃什的立场可归纳为推动“新财政-货币协议“（New Treasury-Fed Accord）。在此前一次CNBC访谈中，沃什明确提议重构美联储与财政部的职能关系，参照1951年《财政部-美联储协议》重新划定两者的职责边界。其核心主张在于：美联储应专注于利率管理，财政部则负责政府债务与财政账户运营，两者权责须严格区隔，以防止政治因素渗透货币政策决策。在资产负债表管理层面，沃什对美联储在经济平稳时期持续扩表的做法持批评态度，将当前约70k亿美元的资产负债表规模视为多轮危机应对后遗留的非常态膨胀。基于这一判断，他主张美联储应加快缩表进程，并缩短资产组合久期，以推动货币政策正常化。

第七，在对市场沟通机制的理解上，沃什曾公开批评鲍威尔时代的沟通策略过度透明，认为高频次、高确定性的政策信号削弱了市场的自主定价功能与风险识别能力。因此，若沃什主导政策沟通改革，点阵图可能面临取消或实质性修订，联储官员的公开表态频次亦可能显著压缩。这意味着市场将重新进入政策路径高度不确定、能见度下降的环境，市场可能需在定价中纳入更高的波动率溢价，以对冲货币政策可预见性下降所带来的风险。

第八，简单来说，沃什的政策理念可能带来美联储政策框架的三个转向：一是政策分析范式从需求侧转向供给侧；二是职能定位从兼顾金融稳定与宏观调控的多重目标，回归以价格稳定为核心的货币政策本位；三是市场沟通从高透明度转向低可预见性。其核心在于，以更具弹性的利率政策配合供给侧的产能扩张释放增长动能，同时通过资产负债表管理对冲潜在通胀风险，形成宽利率、紧资产负债表的政策组合。这一框架的待验证之处有二：一是AI能够从宏观层面带来生产率的实质性提升；二是这种生产率提升背景下的利率宽松确实不会推升通胀。若上述两个结果不及预期，市场将面临期限溢价抬升与二次通胀压力的双重考验。

第九，贵金属市场在1月30日经历了大幅回撤。我们理解贵金属大跌与前期持续上涨积累过高获利盘、机构多头头寸平仓以及程序化交易（CTA）叠加影响有关；从“沃什效应”的角度来说，市场的担心可能包括：（1）沃什排斥赤字货币化，并且主张缩表。如果未来美联储显著缩表，那么可能重新有利于美元信用，美元指数提振将打破贵金属的关键支撑逻辑（信用货币贬值预期）；（2）尽管沃什认为新技术可以消灭通胀，但这毕竟是一种长叙事；对于现实的通胀问题本身他属于鹰派，市场担心一旦短期通胀失控，他可能会以坚决的紧缩路径应对。恰好1月30日公布的美国PPI数据超预期，放大了市场的担忧。

正文

2026年1月30日，特朗普宣布他将提名沃什担任下届美联储主席，接替鲍威尔，鲍威尔作为主席的任期将于 5 月届满。特朗普在声明中回顾了沃什的职业背景，并声称沃什将成为“史上最伟大的美联储主席之一”（he will go down as one of the great Fed chairmen），且“绝不会让人失望”（he will never let you down）。提名仍需参议院银行委员会听证及全体投票确认。

On January 30, Trump announced that he would nominate Kevin Wosh to be the next Chair of the Federal Reserve, replacing Jerome Powell (Jerome Powell); Powell’s term as Chair will end in May.

Trump has high praise for Wosh, calling him an “ideal pick” in the style of “Central Casting” (Central Casting). “Central Casting” was originally the name of a casting company in the U.S., specializing in finding background actors or supporting actors that best fit the character’s image. We understand that when Trump uses this phrase to describe Wosh, on the one hand he is saying that Wosh has traits recognized by Wall Street—market sensitivity, connections, and hands-on experience handling financial crises; on the other hand, in Trump’s context, it may also mean that the person Trump selected will, to a certain extent, be willing to accept his vision.

Wosh’s resume is extremely diverse. He has hands-on experience across Wall Street M&A, White House economic policy work, and crisis response at the Federal Reserve. He served as an Executive Director at Morgan Stanley responsible for M&A from 1995 to 2002, and is familiar with how Wall Street operates; from 2002 to 2006, he was a Special Assistant for Economic Policy to the White House and Executive Secretary of the National Economic Council. In 2006 to 2011, he served as a Federal Reserve Governor. During the 2008 global financial crisis, he was the chief liaison between the Federal Reserve and Wall Street, and he also served as a representative to the G20. In 2011, he resigned because of his opposition to the second round of quantitative easing (QE2), believing that such large-scale purchases of bonds would distort markets and could lead to serious inflation in the future and looser fiscal discipline. After leaving the Federal Reserve, Wosh served as a Senior Visiting Scholar at the Hoover Institution of Stanford University, and he is also a partner at the Duqun Family Office.

Wosh’s resume is very diverse. Wosh previously served as an Executive Director at Morgan Stanley responsible for M&A business from 1995 to 2002, and is familiar with the mechanisms of how Wall Street operates; from 2002 to 2006, he served as Special Assistant for Economic Policy to the White House and Executive Secretary of the National Economic Council.

In 2006 to 2011, he served as a Federal Reserve Governor, becoming the youngest governor in history at age 35. During the 2008 global financial crisis, he served as the main liaison between the Federal Reserve and Wall Street. Wosh resigned from the governor role in March 2011, mainly due to an ideological disagreement over Bank Bernanke’s QE2; he believed that this kind of behavior—buying bonds at massive scale—would distort markets and could lead to a rebound in inflation and looser fiscal discipline in the future.

In terms of professional capabilities, Wosh has a deep understanding of the financial cycle and the underlying drivers of liquidity. In May 2008, before global markets had fully realized that risks were coming, Wosh pointed out, “The global financial system is facing severe undercapitalization (Significant Undercapitalization),” while many policymakers at the time still believed that the subprime mortgage crisis was locally controllable.

In terms of hands-on experience, in September 2008, during the period when Bear Stearns and Lehman collapsed and Wall Street’s confidence crumbled, Wosh personally took part in emergency negotiations for Morgan Stanley (Morgan Stanley) to transform into a bank holding company. This strategic transformation not only won Morgan Stanley permanent support from the Federal Reserve’s discount window, but also blocked a run on the market at the level of market sentiment.

After leaving the Federal Reserve, Wosh served as a Senior Visiting Scholar at the Hoover Institution of Stanford University, and he is also a partner at the Duqun Family Office.

In terms of his understanding of growth, Wosh is more like a quasi-supply-side school. He believes that the U.S. economy is below its potential growth rate not because aggregate demand is insufficient, but because inefficient capital allocation and tighter regulation have suppressed the supply side. He believes the Federal Reserve currently underestimates the resilience of the U.S. economy in its understanding of potential growth, while also overlooking the nonlinear growth potential brought by technological change. Wosh believes the U.S. economy is going through an AI-driven productivity boom. If the annual labor productivity growth rate can be increased by 1 percentage point, living standards can double within a single generation, and it will not bring inflation.

Warsh’s understanding of U.S. economic growth is based on the supply-side school tradition, which sharply contrasts with the demand-management framework mainstream in the Powell era Federal Reserve. During his tenure as a Fed Governor, he delivered a speech titled “Rejecting the Requiem,” in which he clearly criticized a policy orientation that relies solely on demand stimulus.

Policymakers should also take notice of the critical importance of the supply side of the economy． The supply side establishes its productive capacity． It is a function of the quality and quantity of labor and capital assembled by our companies． Recovery after a recession demands that capital and labor be reallocated． But， the reallocation of these resources to new sectors and companies has been painfully slow and unnecessarily interrupted。

In his view, over the past 15 years, especially QE and the long period of low interest rates, the Federal Reserve’s policies have not only failed to unleash economic potential, but have distorted capital allocation—shifting resources from productive investment to financial speculation. As he wrote in a 2025 column for The Wall Street Journal, Wall Street’s money is too loose, while Main Street’s credit is too tight. The Fed’s massive balance sheet (used to support companies from the crisis era), can be reduced significantly. In other words, he believes that accommodative monetary policy has not boosted the real economy; instead, by blurring the boundary between fiscal and monetary policy, it has helped foster inefficient public spending and moral hazard in the private sector.

“Money on Wall Street is too easy， and credit on Main Street is too tight． The Fed‘s bloated balance sheet， designed to support the biggest firms in a bygone crisis era， can be reduced significantly．”

In addition, Warsh believes the bottleneck for economic growth is not insufficient aggregate demand stimulus, but structural obstacles on the supply side—overregulation, capital misallocation, and the central bank’s distortion of market price signals.

Pro-growth policies also demand reform in the conduct of regulatory policy． It would provide more timely， clear， and consistent rules so that firms–financial and otherwise–could innovate in a changing economic landscape． It would allow firms to succeed or fail． It would not protect the privileged perch of incumbent firms–no matter their size or scope–at the expense of their smaller， more dynamic competitors

More notably, Warsh remains optimistic about technological change and productivity growth. He believes the Federal Reserve’s current estimates of potential growth significantly underestimate the resilience of the U.S. economy, while also overlooking the nonlinear growth leap that general-purpose technologies such as AI may bring. In an April 2025 G30/IMF speech, Warsh stated clearly that productivity is the key to achieving prosperity without inflation. If we can increase the annual labor productivity growth rate by even 1 percentage point, we can double living standards within a generation—and we will do so without triggering price instability.

“Productivity is the key to prosperity without inflation． If we can raise labor productivity growth by even one percentage point annually， we can double living standards in a single generation — and do so without triggering price instability．”

This view implies that if the Federal Reserve continues to understand the economy using outdated Phillips curve frameworks, then strong growth could automatically be treated as an inflation risk—leading to policy tightening too early and choking off the endogenous vitality generated by the productivity boom. Warsh’s framework suggests that under an AI-driven new economic paradigm, the Federal Reserve should tolerate higher real growth rates without worrying about inflation, provided monetary discipline is restored and capital flows into truly productive investment rather than being pushed toward speculative assets by artificially suppressed interest rates.

In terms of his understanding of inflation, Wosh views inflation as the Federal Reserve’s main responsibility (Fed is chiefly responsible), rather than a passive outcome of external shocks—that is, inflation is a choice (inflation is a choice). He believes that during the high-inflation period of the past few years, the Federal Reserve attributing inflation to external factors was a form of shifting blame, directly negating the logic in the Powell era that 2021–2022 inflation was caused by supply chains and the Russia-Ukraine conflict. We understand that under Wosh’s framework, the Federal Reserve will not excuse cost-push inflation. If tariffs or supply shocks push up prices, his reaction function is more likely to tighten than to wait and see—sharply contrasting with the “transitory inflation” narrative from the Powell era.

In a July 2025 Hoover Institution interview, Wosh mentioned that he believes what Milton Friedman said—that inflation is a choice. Congress assigned the responsibility for ensuring price stability to the Federal Reserve in a review of its statutes in the 1970s, with the purpose of making one institution responsible for prices instead of blaming others. He believes that when policymakers first ignore the problem and then shift responsibility elsewhere, the risk of an inflation spiral arises. When the central bank acts slowly or lacks determination, inflation becomes embedded in the price-formation process.

He also noted that from comments in the past few years, you wouldn’t know that inflation is a choice. In fact, during the preparation period for the broad inflation over the past five or six years, what were the causes of inflation we heard? It was Putin in Ukraine. It was the pandemic and supply chains. Milton would be furious to hear that.

“I believe what Milton Friedman and you just channeled， which is inflation is a choice．．． inflation and ensuring price stability was granted to the Federal Reserve by the Congress most recently in a review of its statutes in the 1970s． So that there would be one agency that would be responsible for prices． No more blaming the other guy． We‘re giving the baton to you， the Central Bank．”

“Now you wouldn‘t know from recent commentary of the last several years that inflation were a choice． In fact， during the run up to the great inflation last five or six years， what did we hear about the causes of inflation？ It was because of Putin in Ukraine． It was because of the pandemic and supply chains． Well， Milton would be outraged to hear that．”

We understand that Wosh’s framework implies the Federal Reserve will not excuse cost-push inflation. If tariffs or supply shocks push up prices, his reaction function is more likely to tighten than to tolerate—sharply contrasting with the transitory inflation narrative from the Powell era.

In terms of his understanding of interest-rate policy, Wosh’s public statements historically have overall leaned hawkish, but Trump has said multiple times that Wosh supports rate cuts. Based on Wosh’s academic propositions and recent remarks, we tend to believe that his policy stance will support gradual rate cuts. The core logic is to reassess the Fed’s policy path using a supply-side framework: rate cuts are not intended to smooth demand, but to adapt to supply. Wosh believes that the negative correlation between unemployment and inflation described by the traditional Phillips curve has become less effective; an AI-driven jump in productivity is reshaping the boundary of potential output for the U.S. economy, so that while the economy maintains strong growth, it does not necessarily trigger inflation pressures—thereby providing policy room to maintain lower interest-rate levels. This framework aligns closely with Trump’s policy desire to reduce financing costs.

Wosh believes the Federal Reserve should not mechanically keep interest rates high just because economic data look strong. He argues that if growth is driven by productivity (especially AI infrastructure and applications), then this growth is fundamentally disinflationary. He criticizes the existing Fed model for focusing too much on demand-side pressures and ignoring expansion on the supply side.

Wosh believes high wages and strong growth do not necessarily lead to inflation. As long as productivity improves faster than the growth of the money supply and government spending, interest rates have room to move lower, supporting a long-term capital expenditure cycle.

“The dogmatic belief that inflation occurs when workers earn too much should be discarded．．． AI would boost productivity， strengthen U.S． competitiveness， and act as a disinflationary force．”

In addition, Wosh has long criticized the Federal Reserve’s view that strong economic growth leads to inflation. He believes the Federal Reserve under Powell misjudged inflation in 2021–2022 because they tried to manage the economy by fine-tuning demand, while ignoring structural supply shocks; printing money is the core problem.

“The Fed’s economic models wrongly assume that rapid economic growth threatens to elevate inflation． Instead， inflation is caused when government spends too much and prints too much．”。

We understand that this implies the Fed under Wosh may no longer view GDP growth above 3% as an overheating signal, thus avoiding preventive rate hikes in order to curb growth. He also mentioned in an October 2025 interview that we can significantly lower interest rates, making 30-year fixed-rate mortgages affordable again and restarting the housing market. The way to do that is to free up the balance sheet—take money out of Wall Street.

“We can lower interest rates a lot， and in so doing get 30-year fixed-rate mortgages so they‘re affordable， so we can get the housing market to get going again． And the way to do that is， as you say， to free up the balance sheet， take money out of Wall Street．”

In terms of how he understands the relationship between monetary policy and fiscal policy, Wosh’s position can be summarized as pushing for a “New Treasury-Fed Accord.” In a previous CNBC interview, Wosh explicitly proposed restructuring the functional relationship between the Federal Reserve and the Treasury Department, and redrawing the boundaries of their responsibilities by referencing the 1951 “Treasury-Fed Accord.” Its core proposition is: the Fed should focus on interest rate management, while the Treasury is responsible for managing government debt and fiscal accounts; the division of powers and responsibilities between the two must be strictly separated to prevent political factors from seeping into monetary policy decision-making. At the level of balance sheet management, Wosh has a critical stance toward the Fed’s practice of continuously expanding its balance sheet during periods of economic stability, viewing the current balance sheet size of about $7 trillion as an abnormal expansion left over from multiple rounds of crisis response. Based on this judgment, he argues that the Fed should accelerate the process of balance sheet reduction and shorten the duration of the asset portfolio in order to push forward monetary policy normalization.

In a July 2025 CNBC interview, Wosh mentioned the phrase, “We need a new Treasury-Fed accord, like we did in 1951—that was after another period where we built up our nation‘s debt and our central bank and the Treasury‘s goals were at cross purposes. That is the state of things now. If we have a new accord, then the Fed chair and the Treasury Secretary can describe clearly and with deliberation to the markets: ‘This is our target for the size of the Fed’s balance sheet.’” In a May 2025 Hoover Institution interview, he also said that the Treasury Secretary should be responsible as the fiscal authority, rather than blurring these responsibilities into the Fed; that would only bring politics into the Fed.

“We need a new Treasury-Fed accord， like we did in 1951 after another period where we built up our nation‘s debt and we were stuck with a central bank that was working at cross purposes with the Treasury． That’s the state of things now． So if we have a new accord， then the Fed chair and the Treasury Secretary can describe to markets plainly and with deliberation， ‘This is our objective for the size of the Fed’s balance sheet”

We understand that Wosh believes the Fed’s balance sheet should be used for emergencies, and when the crisis abates, the Fed should exit (reduce the balance sheet).

However, the current level of bank reserves has fallen from its peak, and further balance sheet reduction faces liquidity constraints. Therefore, Wosh’s framework may include: coordinating with the Treasury on the structure of Treasury debt issuance, adjusting the reserve requirement mechanism, or achieving a “shadow reduction” of the balance sheet through other tools. Specific operational details in this area are still to be confirmed.

In terms of his understanding of the market communication mechanism, Wosh has publicly criticized the communication strategy from the Powell era as being overly transparent, arguing that high-frequency, high-certainty policy signals weaken the market’s functions for autonomous pricing and risk identification. Therefore, if Wosh leads reforms in policy communication, the dot plot could face cancellation or substantial revisions, and the frequency of public remarks by Fed officials could also be significantly compressed. This means the market will re-enter an environment where policy paths are highly uncertain and visibility declines; the market may need to incorporate higher volatility risk premia into pricing to hedge risks arising from lower predictability of monetary policy.

In the August 2016 issue of The Wall Street Journal, Wosh, in an article titled “The Federal Reserve Needs New Thinking,” mentioned that in recent years the execution of monetary policy has had serious flaws; the reform agenda needs more rigorous scrutiny of recent policy choices, along with major changes to the Fed’s tools, strategies, communications, and governance.

“The conduct of monetary policy in recent years has been deeply flawed．．． A robust reform agenda requires more rigorous review of recent policy choices and significant changes in the Fed‘s tools， strategies， communications and governance．“

Simply put, Wosh’s policy philosophy could bring three shifts in the Fed’s policy framework: first, the analytical paradigm for policy would shift from the demand side to the supply side; second, the functional positioning would shift from multiple objectives that balance financial stability with macroeconomic management back to a monetary policy framework centered on price stability; third, market communication would shift from high transparency to lower predictability. The core is to use a more flexible interest-rate policy in coordination with supply-side capacity expansion to release growth momentum, while also hedging potential inflation risks through balance sheet management—forming a policy combination of a wider interest-rate stance and a tighter balance sheet. There are two things to be validated in this framework: first, whether AI can bring a substantial, real improvement in productivity from a macro perspective; second, whether in the context of that productivity improvement, interest-rate easing truly will not lift inflation. If the two outcomes above fall short of expectations, the market will face a dual test: higher term premia and renewed inflation pressures.

At the level of the policy framework, Wosh’s taking office may bring three shifts. First, the Fed’s analytical paradigm would shift from demand-side management to a supply-side logic, meaning the Fed may no longer view GDP growth above 3% as an overheating signal. Second, the Fed’s functional positioning would shift from multiple goals that combine financial stability with macro control back to a monetary policy framework centered on price stability; functions such as bank supervision and climate risk guidelines could be returned to the Treasury-led side—i.e., the core of the Fed’s independence would be its unilateral authority to determine the benchmark interest rate and the inflation target. Third, market communication would shift from high transparency to reducing policy predictability, and the dot plot may face cancellation or substantial revision, requiring the market to incorporate higher volatility risk premia in pricing.

For the market, if Wosh’s supply-side logic leads policy making, it would open room for rate cuts while maintaining higher growth expectations. However, the effectiveness of this logic depends highly on a real, substantial improvement in productivity. In addition, Wosh’s long-standing critical stance toward balance sheet expansion suggests that while guiding short-term interest rates lower, he may adopt a more aggressive pace of balance sheet reduction. This could steepen the U.S. Treasury yield curve and significantly raise volatility in long-end rates. If supply-side reforms advance later than expected, the market will face a dual test: higher term premia and renewed inflation pressures.

On January 30, the precious metals market experienced a sharp pullback. We understand that the big drop in precious metals is related to a combination of factors: profit-taking positions that had accumulated too much after the continued rise earlier, institutional long positions unwinding, and the overlay impact of algorithmic trading (CTA). From the perspective of the “Wosh effect,” market concerns may include: (1) Wosh rejects deficit monetization and advocates balance sheet reduction. If the Fed significantly reduces its balance sheet in the future, it could become favorable again for dollar credit; the strength in the U.S. dollar index would break the key support logic for precious metals (the expectation that credit money will depreciate); (2) although Wosh believes new technology can eliminate inflation, after all this is a long narrative. On real-world inflation issues themselves, he is hawkish; the market worries that if near-term inflation gets out of control, he may respond with a firm tightening path. It just so happened that the U.S. PPI data released on January 30 came in above expectations, amplifying market concerns.

Risk warning: Inflation falling short of expectations or fiscal easing triggering excess demand, forcing the Fed to keep high interest rates for longer. Uncertainty in geopolitical developments and potential changes in tariff policy could pose a supply-side shock to supply chain recovery. If macro data deviate from the baseline soft-landing path, asset prices currently pricing in rate cuts and a soft landing may face a severe risk of valuation adjustment.

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