Credit "Freshness Period" Less Than 100 Days: Beijing Bank Withdraws from Collection, ST Yingfei's "Life-saving Money" Turns into a "Death Omen"

On March 24, 2026, ST Enfitu (rights protection) (002528) disclosed a major litigation announcement to the public. The company and four wholly owned subsidiaries were sued by the Shenzhen Branch of Beijing Bank (601169) to the People’s Court of Futian District, Shenzhen, over a financial loan contract dispute. The total amount involved—including principal, interest, penalties for late payment, compounding interest, and lawyers’ fees—came to RMB 47.82M.

The Shenzhen Branch of Beijing Bank had just injected nearly RMB 50 million in liquidity to this highly leveraged ST company in November 2025. Only two months later, as interest payments became overdue, it immediately initiated an early loan-repayment collection process, and then launched judicial recovery. This entire credit relationship, lasting less than 100 days, precisely illustrates the real situation of ST Enfitu being deeply mired in a debt quagmire and having its creditworthiness comprehensively deteriorated at present.

“Fast In and Out”: A 60-Day Bridge Loan and Rapid Debt Recovery

The timeline goes back to late autumn of 2025. By the end of October, Shenzhen weather still had lingering warmth, but ST Enfitu’s financial condition had already hit a freezing point. At that time, Enfitu had been subject to other risk warnings. Behind being labeled “star-wearing hat,” the company’s revenue had been dramatically reduced due to the contraction of its core business. The company’s overall operations and financial fundamentals continued to face strong pressure. The company’s 2025 third-quarter report shows that its asset-liability ratio had risen to a high of 79.75%, while both the current ratio and quick ratio fell to historical lows. Its short-term solvency and cash liquidity were significantly weakened, and its overall financial situation can be described as hanging by a thread.

Even under such financial circumstances, on November 28, 2025, the Shenzhen Branch of Beijing Bank still jointly signed multiple《Loan Contracts》with ST Enfitu and its four wholly owned subsidiaries—Enfitu Intelligent, Enfitu Renzhong, Enfitu Software, and Enfitu Zhiyuan—granting concrete credit facilities. Based on the information disclosed in the announcement, this credit injection targeted liquidity replenishment. Enfitu Intelligent, Renzhong, and Zhiyuan each received loan额度 of about RMB 10 million, Enfitu Software received a RMB 7 million额度, and in addition, the parent company-level liquidity loan totaled RMB 9.98 million. Within a short period, Beijing Bank cumulatively injected nearly RMB 50 million in liquidity into this security-technology enterprise mired in operational difficulties. Among them, the RMB 9.98 million liquidity loan’s original maturity date was October 29, 2026.

Combining publicly available market information and industry credit logic, this contra-season credit injection reflects risk trade-offs under multiple overlapping backgrounds. On the one hand, it may be a debt succession or extension arrangement based on long-term cooperation between the two parties. On the other hand, perhaps from the bank’s risk-control perspective, it still maintains a certain credit expectation for this publicly listed company that is deeply held by Enfitu Holding. However, credit support in financial markets has always relied on real operating performance and repayment capacity. Even if it appears to be a temporary tilt in credit, before substantial default signals emerge, it remains in a fragile balance.

This balance was completely broken in January 2026, and the turning point came directly and clearly. On January 21, 2026, ST Enfitu failed to pay an interest installment on time. Although the amount of this single default was in the million-level and did not result in a large-scale overdue principal, within the bank’s strict risk-warning system, interest delinquency was already a core signal of the company’s cash flow breaking and its creditworthiness worsening—equivalent to a substantive loosening of the credit defenses. Just nine days later, on January 30, 2026, the Shenzhen Branch of Beijing Bank officially issued an《Early Loan Repayment Notice》，announcing that the previously issued total of RMB 36.95 million of subsidiary loans, as well as the RMB 9.98 million parent-company loan originally due in October 2026, would all become due early on January 28, 2026.

It is not hard to see the timeline through calculation: from the actual disbursement of funds at the end of November 2025 to the announcement that all loans would be collected early by the end of January 2026, this emergency loan that originally had a period of nearly one year was compressed to an effective life of about 60 days—forming a typical “fast in and out” operation. Beijing Bank’s risk-control measures did not stop at the written notice; it simultaneously initiated judicial procedures, quickly filing a lawsuit with the People’s Court of Futian District, Shenzhen, requiring ST Enfitu to repay the loan principal, interest, penalties, compounding interest, and related lawyers’ fees. The total amount involved was precisely RMB 47,816,225.97.

For ST Enfitu at that time, this litigation payment was undoubtedly a severe blow. The company had already forecast that its net assets at the end of 2025 would turn negative, ranging from RMB -65 million to RMB -130 million. With the company already sliding toward delisting, its cash flow—already exhausted—was instantly frozen, further cutting off the source of working-capital turnover for operations. This rapid credit disposal was not deliberate pressure from a financial institution. When dealing with highly leveraged ST-class clients, it is a routine risk-control defense of “fast in and fast out” and precise recovery. And through a set of real data points, it also clearly reflects that under the crushing weight of debt, the credit link between a crisis-stricken company and financial institutions was fragile to the point of being easily broken.

A Shadow of Evergrande Debt: A RMB 70 Million Bad Debt That Smothers the Operating Fundamentals

Beijing Bank’s rapid loan pullback became the key strike that crushed ST Enfitu’s capital chain, but tracing back to the root cause of the company’s crisis, it is the long-drawn-out entanglement over accounts receivable between it and the Evergrande Group that truly seeded the core trigger of this financial crisis—and also the fundamental reason the enterprise continued to bleed without being able to rescue itself. From the company’s operating trajectory, ST Enfitu’s overall decline largely resulted from over-reliance on a single major customer and the concentration of risk blowups after the industry cycle downturn—essentially the typical pains after the collapse of a “Evergrande dependency syndrome.”

Roll the timeline back to June 4, 2020. ST Enfitu’s wholly owned subsidiary, Newpu Interconnect, signed two《Advertising Release Contracts》with Evergrande Real Estate. The total contract amount was RMB 71.44M, agreeing that Evergrande would provide network advertising release services on the Baidu platform. During the boom period of rapid expansion and leveraged operations in the real estate industry, this large-ticket business had been a high-quality revenue source on the company’s financial statements, providing strong support for that period’s operating performance. But once Evergrande’s debt crisis fully broke out in 2021, the service fees of nearly RMB 71.44M quickly turned from high-quality accounts receivable into uncollectible bad and doubtful debts. The company’s recorded assets shrank instantly on paper.

To recover this payment, Newpu Interconnect formally filed a lawsuit in April 2024 and obtained a first-instance winning judgment from the People’s Court of Nanshan District, Shenzhen on May 9, 2025. However, given the real-world context that Evergrande’s assets were repeatedly frozen through multiple rounds and the company itself fell into difficulties in debt restructuring, the winning judgment did not translate into actual cash recovery. Ultimately, the case entered the process of termination and enforcement, resulting in the awkward situation of “winning the case but being unable to recover the funds.” With no choice, ST Enfitu had to recognize a full provision for impairment as bad debts for that accounts receivable. This action directly drained the already tight cash flow of the company, creating a financial gap that could not be repaired for the long term, continuously consuming the company’s remaining operational momentum.

The negative impact of Evergrande’s debt did not stop at historical bad debts. It was more like a domino effect, fully piercing through ST Enfitu’s operational bottom line in 2025. The company’s subsequent disclosure of its 2025 performance forecast is essentially a financial-level operational warning. It expected that the net profit attributable to shareholders of the listed company would be a loss of RMB 240 million to RMB 310 million. Although the loss narrowed compared with the approximate RMB 404 million loss in the same period of the previous year, what truly crossed the red line for delisting risk was the net assets turning from positive to negative. The forecast clearly shows that the net assets attributable to shareholders of the listed company at the end of 2025 were expected to fall to the RMB -65 million to RMB -130 million range. Under the strict delisting rules for A-shares, net assets turning negative means the company would face an upgraded delisting risk warning. After the annual report is formally disclosed, the stock abbreviation will most likely change from “ST” to “*ST,” placing the company firmly on the edge of delisting.

Behind the significant loss in performance and the turn of net assets negative is the collapse across the board of the company’s three major core business segments, with its operating logic facing a full-spectrum shock. First, the digital operations service business suffered continuous losses in the early period, forcing the company in the second half of 2024 to implement a contraction strategy. This “cutting off an arm to survive” move directly caused revenue from this segment to become zero in 2025, eliminating an important revenue pillar. Second, the core-supporting business, the Internet of Things (IoT) product business, is highly dependent on overseas markets. Under dual pressures of weak overseas demand and rising supply chain costs, the inventory liquidation cycle for finished products was significantly lengthened, and the revenue scale and profit levels continued to decline step by step. Third, the solutions business was affected by extremely insufficient working capital. A large number of existing projects fell into a state of suspension or delivery delays, making it impossible to form effective cash collection.

The 79.75% high asset-liability ratio in the company’s 2025 third-quarter report had already hinted at the company’s burden of moving forward while heavily loaded. Meanwhile, the continuously expanding losses and the expectation that net assets would turn negative caused financial institutions that had originally held a cautious, wait-and-see stance to completely give up waiting. With institutions represented by Beijing Bank initiating loan pullbacks and debt recovery, this was not a sudden move; it was the inevitable choice under risk-control logic after the company’s credit fundamentals continued to deteriorate.

A Domino-Style Risk: Banks Collectively Pull Loans and the Company Falls Deep Into the “Execution and Cutting-Off Line”

In this risk-control disposal targeting high-risk enterprises, Beijing Bank was not an isolated case; it was a microcosm of collective risk avoidance by financial institutions. As ST Enfitu’s debt default signals were released and financial risks were fully exposed, multiple mainstream banks among its creditor list successively initiated risk disposal procedures. This created a chain-reaction effect of loan pullbacks and rapid recovery, further accelerating the company’s credit collapse. In early 2026, ST Enfitu found itself almost in a passive situation of racing between bank collection notices and loan collection notices. Various debt-related announcements were released one after another—both reflecting the continuous accumulation of liabilities and showcasing financial institutions’ concentrated instinct to avoid risk.

In February 2026, this bank debt-recovery storm entered a peak. On February 9, the Shenzhen Branch of Huaxia Bank (600015) was the first to announce the early collection of a RMB 57.5 million loan. On February 28, the same bank further added disposals and implemented the full early collection of loan principal totaling RMB 21.1089 million for its subsidiaries Enfitu Zhiyuan and Enfitu Renzhong. Meanwhile, the Shenzhen Branch of China CITIC Bank (601998) adopted an even stronger disposal approach, directly initiating full recovery against overdue principal totaling RMB 150 million for ST Enfitu and its subsidiaries. The Shenzhen Buji Branch of Bank of China (601988) started disposal even earlier, announcing at the end of January that loans under a RMB 170 million loan contract would all reach maturity early.

Within just one month, the total overdue and early-matured principal accumulated by ST Enfitu rose rapidly from RMB 263 million to RMB 486.7 million. This figure accounted for 277.48% of the company’s audited net assets for 2024, meaning that even if the company disposed of all existing assets, it would still be unable to cover the debt that broke out in a concentrated manner; its repayment capacity completely collapsed.

Multiple banks’ concentrated loan pullbacks are standard risk-control operations in the financial industry. When ST Enfitu’s asset-liability ratio approached 80%, when its net assets turned from expected losses to negative for 2025, and when its full-year net profit loss exceeded RMB 200 million, the core objective of bank risk control had shifted from earning interest income to preserving the safety of credit assets—prioritizing avoidance of bad-debt risks. This risk-control logic was also corroborated by Beijing Bank’s operations involving other high-risk listed companies. On January 8, 2026, the snow wave environment company that was trapped in a pre-restructuring predicament also received the Shenzhen Branch of Beijing Bank’s《All Loan Repayment Notice》，requiring repayment of a total of RMB 35.04M in principal, including part of loans that had become due early.

These two parallel disposals precisely confirm the core risk-control logic of financial institutions: after the credit and fundamentals of listed companies deteriorate, a bank’s primary goal is to preserve its credit assets, not to add credit in a contrarian manner.

The concentrated loan pullbacks by financial institutions quickly triggered a chain reaction, pushing ST Enfitu into a vicious cycle that was difficult to break out of. The banks’ loan pullbacks directly cut off the company’s external financing channels. The already tight working capital quickly ran out of funds. On top of this, multiple banks applied for judicial disposal, resulting in multiple bank accounts of the company and subsidiaries being frozen, involving multiple institutions including the Shenzhen Branch of Ningbo Bank and the China CITIC International Building branch of China CITIC Bank in Shenzhen. At the same time, the company’s equity holdings in subsidiaries such as Enfitu (Hangzhou) Technology Co., Ltd. were also subject to judicial preservation due to contract disputes, involving amounts ranging from several million yuan to tens of millions of yuan.

Account freezes and equity preservation caused working capital to be completely cut off. Existing solution projects were forced to be suspended because the company lacked the ability to pay project engineering funds. Delivery delays further intensified difficulties in cash collection. Insufficient cash collection in turn worsened debt default, ultimately forming a closed-loop dead cycle of “debt default—bank loan pullbacks—asset freezes—business shutdown—credit downgrade.” This is not only ST Enfitu’s survival predicament as a single company, but also a general rule in the capital market. When high-risk enterprises lose support from financial leverage and their creditworthiness collapses completely, financial institutions’ risk-control systems will follow the “safety first” principle and decisively cut off fragile credit links.

Beijing Bank’s early recovery of loans to ST Enfitu in less than three months became a key turning point in the concentrated outbreak of its credit crisis. The bank’s rapid loss containment is only a routine risk-control operation. The core roots are that the company’s finances continued to deteriorate, Evergrande-related bad debts were fully provided for, and its core businesses collapsed across the board. These are the core reasons it fell deep into a debt quagmire and was nearing delisting. Currently, the company has high levels of overdue debts, dried-up cash flow, and operations effectively halted. Its self-rescue space continues to shrink. With the disclosure of its 2025 annual report imminent, whether it can reverse the situation of negative net assets and avoid delisting risk, the market is still taking a wait-and-see stance.

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