Bull Talk: A New Big Trouble Is Coming

(I)

For the Gulf states, a new big problem has arrived.

Enough small talk—three layers.

First, Trump couldn’t control his own mouth again.

He has again publicly threatened Iran: if the Strait of Hormuz cannot be “opened for commerce” immediately, the United States “will completely destroy all of Iran’s power plants, oil wells, and Kharak Island, and possibly also all of the seawater desalination plants!”

War crimes or no war crimes—the president doesn’t care.

But the moment this sentence was out, investors felt a jolt, and international oil prices jumped sharply again.

In the early hours of March 31 Beijing time, I saw CNN, with no lack of emotion, put out a piece of news: American oil prices for the first time since July 2022 have exceeded $100 per barrel…

Why is it rising?

It’s very simple: if the United States attacks Iran’s infrastructure, Iran will definitely retaliate fiercely—and it has already said it will attack power plants, oil wells, and seawater desalination plants in Gulf countries.

If oil can’t be shipped out, that is a major crisis for the Gulf states, but it still isn’t fatal to the point of death. If the seawater desalination plants are destroyed, then for more than a hundred million people in the Middle East, it’s unquestionably catastrophic—it concerns survival.

For the Gulf states, is continuing like this crazy thing good news or bad news?

Second, Trump finally let the truth slip out.

It feels a bit ridiculous and laughable—now the United States doesn’t even pretend anymore.

In the past, when the United States attacked Iraq, even Secretary of State Powell still had at least a small glass tube in hand, shook in some laundry powder, and accused Iraq of producing weapons of mass destruction.

But now, when Trump says he will strike, he strikes. While talks with Iran are still ongoing on one side, on the other side he beheads Iran’s top leader. As for the reasons for war—changing and changing—people around the world are a little confused.

Now, Trump has let the truth slip out even more: I want to seize Iran’s oil.

In an interview with the British Financial Times, Trump said bluntly that he hopes to do it “like in Venezuela,” to “seize oil” from Iran.

“Honestly, what I want to do the most is seize Iran’s oil, but some ‘idiots’ in the United States will ask, ‘Why would you do that?’ But they’re just idiots.”

Don’t doubt it—this is Trump’s exact words, no ifs, no maybes.

From this angle, perhaps we can understand why the United States moved against Venezuela and then moved against Iran for an important reason: they have a lot of oil, and the U.S. is eyeing it.

The common man has no crime; owning valuable things invites crime.

In this world, what you fear is not thieves, but those who are coveting what you have.

So if the United States could seize Venezuela yesterday, then could it seize Iran today—what about Saudi Arabia tomorrow, Kuwait, Qatar, the UAE…

For the Gulf states, once this window of paper is pierced, is it good news or bad news?

Third, the United States has new ways to make money.

War is the most expensive kind of business. This Iran war—if the United States doesn’t spend several tens of billions, it won’t be possible. And if you add other expenses, it’s at least on the scale of several hundred billion dollars.

Where does the money come from?

Does the United States pay it itself? Trump definitely wouldn’t want that a bit.

Seizing oil can make up for part of it, but what if Iran doesn’t agree? Trump’s eyes have already locked onto a new target.

At a White House press briefing, there was such an exchange.

A reporter asked: Who will bear the cost of this war? Will those Arab countries step up and pay?

White House press secretary Leavitt: I think President Trump would be very happy to convene them to discuss this.

Discuss what?

That’s definitely extorting the big spenders!

For the Gulf states, even though the United States can’t protect them, the protection fee still has to be collected. Is that good news or bad news?

(II)

Actually, there are still plenty of bad pieces of news.

After the Strait of Hormuz was blocked, Saudi Arabia still had some room to maneuver—by using oil pipelines across the Arabian Peninsula, the oil that used to be shipped from the Gulf could be transported to be loaded in the Red Sea.

That way, it wouldn’t need to pass through the Strait of Hormuz.

But the problem is that Yemen’s Houthi armed forces have already announced that they’re joining the fight and have fired missiles to attack Israel. If the fighting expands, will the Houthis, as before, blockade the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait and blockade the Red Sea?

If so, crude oil prices would jump again.

Also, if the United States truly launches a ground war and truly occupies Kharak Island, Iran will certainly retaliate. Iran’s missiles can’t reach the U.S. mainland, but Iran’s missiles and drones attacking American targets in the Middle East are clearly more than enough.

I saw that Iran’s foreign minister, Araghtsi, posted another photo showing a U.S. E-3 early warning aircraft being blown up at a Saudi base, and then said something:

“Iran respects the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and sees it as a brother nation. Our actions are aimed at those who do not respect Arabs and Iranians and cannot provide any security for hostile aggressors. Just look at what we did to their air command—then you’ll know. It’s time to drive the U.S. military out.”

But the question is: will Saudi Arabia drive them out? Can Saudi Arabia drive them out? Does Saudi Arabia dare to drive them out?

Don’t forget: a few days ago, when Trump was in a good mood, he insulted the Saudi Crown Prince, saying: the Saudi Crown Prince “didn’t expect that he would get his ass patted (meaning fawned over).”

Crude, yes—but it’s even a public insult.

Arab people are furious, but what can they do to Trump?

In fact, although there are all kinds of reports claiming that Saudi Arabia and other countries secretly urged the United States to subvert Iran’s government and eliminate the threat completely, that doesn’t rule out it being one-sided information—more like a cognition war.

For the Gulf states, from religious, cultural, and ethnic-national dimensions, Iran is definitely an outlier, and for thousands of years it has been. They are somewhat pleased to see Iran decline; but if you get into a two-way loss situation—let alone put yourself facing a survival problem—that obviously isn’t the best choice.

But the United States doesn’t care.

Trump said it plainly: Gulf countries previously also refused to let U.S. forces use their bases to launch attacks, but “I’ll tell the U.S. commander to use them—they won’t know. Do they even have the capability to know when we take off or when we land? They don’t know at all!”

The chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff also echoed: “I agree with your view. In the end, whether they discover it or not doesn’t matter.”

This world—welcoming gods is easy, sending gods is hard.

(III)

Finally, how should we look at it?

Still, just three basic points.

First, the unlucky “outsiders.”

They intended to stay out of it, but they were dragged, literally, into the vortex.

Before the war began, the Gulf states were mainly mediators—between the United States and Iran, they stitched the needle and threaded the string, urging reconciliation and negotiation.

Who would have thought that even while talks were still going on, as people put it in Oman, negotiations were likely to succeed—and then the United States and Israel suddenly acted, killing Iran’s top leader…

Everything can no longer be undone.

From the perspective of what has been publicly disclosed, the Gulf states strongly opposed the United States taking military action, but the result is simple: opposition is useless. The United States not only wanted to fight, it also wanted to launch attacks from your countries’ bases.

So furious Iran bombed U.S. military bases in these countries from one end to the other. Some missiles and drones with “not-so-good targeting” also bombed the airports, factories, and iconic buildings of these countries…

Once they mediated on the sidelines of the front lines, and now they became the front lines themselves—that is the biggest irony.

Second, the “business playbook” of hegemony.

Hegemony never does unprofitable deals. It both lights the fire of war and sells water to onlookers to put it out.

One of the important negotiation conditions laid out by Iran is that the initiator of the invasion must compensate for war losses.

But having the United States and Israel compensate—Iran is really thinking too much, unless Iranian forces actually reach the U.S.-Israel homeland.

But the U.S.’s war spending—Trump has already decided. First, seize Iran’s oil. Second, extract a “bamboo pole payment” from big Gulf patrons.

Trump’s bamboo poles are loud and clear.

Haven’t there already been reports? If Gulf states want the United States to keep fighting Iran, they pay the United States $5 trillion; if they want the United States to stop the war, they pay $2.5 trillion.

The United States spends at most a few hundred billion, and earns tens of billions—how is that not a win?

War is never the purpose—interest is. And the ones who always end up paying are those “allies” who have no say.

Third, the “losses and wins” of war.

Iran is certainly not the winner.

How many people lost their lives, how much wealth was wiped out. Even though for Iran, resisting the U.S.-Israel attack and not seeing the regime toppled—that counts as victory.

The Gulf states definitely aren’t.

Oil fields damaged, buildings destroyed, investors fleeing, ordinary people suffering—after decades of building a security paradise, it is now shrouded in darkness, oh—and they still have to be extorted by the United States.

Is that right?

Even if we say it is the United States.

Trump always brags that the U.S. has won victory after victory, that it’s won so much it can’t stop—so that Iran even “begs” for a deal to be reached quickly…

Is it really like that?

I saw that some friends abroad lamented: the United States really has opened up a new situation.

1）Iran used to be unable to control the Strait of Hormuz, now it can. 2）Iran’s oil used to face U.S. sanctions, now the sanctions are gone too. 3）Iran used to not be developing nuclear weapons, now it has to. 4）The U.S. military bases in the Gulf were once assets, but now they’ve become liabilities. 5）The U.S. inflation rate once fell, and now it’s rising again…

Oh, and “the U.S. successfully replaced Iran’s Supreme Leader Khamenei with a younger, tougher Khamenei.”

The U.S. isn’t the winner—then who is?

I prepared for this for a full 10 years

Personal views, not representing any institution