Wanda is frantically selling assets, Wang Jianlin is desperately trying to survive

Listing | New Market Trends Author | Song Hui

Wang Jianlin once publicly promised: “Wanda Group will never default on its credit obligations worldwide! We value our credit more than assets or profits.”

So far, Wanda has not publicly defaulted, but behind this are massive asset sales and Wang Jianlin’s growing anxiety.

This former business godfather is now walking a tightrope of debt. Fortunately, 71-year-old Wang Jianlin is still fighting.

Wanda sells 2 billion yuan worth of Shanghai Zhuanqiao Wanda Plaza

According to recent reports, Wanda sold its Shanghai Zhuanqiao Wanda Plaza for 2.048 billion yuan.

The Shanghai Zhuanqiao Wanda Plaza opened in 2017, integrating retail, dining, entertainment, and education, with a total construction area of about 147,500 square meters.

The total price of 2.048 billion yuan corresponds to approximately 147,500 square meters, with a unit price of only 14,000 yuan per square meter.

Compared to other similar locations and scales of commercial complexes, this price level is at the low end of the market. Industry insiders analyze that this price is roughly a 30% discount, meaning the sale of Zhuanqiao Wanda is another “cut to recover cash.”

To date, Wanda has sold over 80 Wanda Plazas in total. Notably, in May 2025, it sold 48 Wanda Plazas in one go.

Information shows that these 48 Wanda Plazas involve projects in major first- and second-tier cities such as Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Nanjing, Chengdu, Harbin, Wuhan, Shijiazhuang, Hangzhou, Chongqing, and Tianjin.

There have also been some reversals during this period.

In December 2025, Wanda redeemed Yantai Zhifu Wanda Plaza from Kunhua Investment, a subsidiary of New China Insurance—this is a high-quality asset with annual rent of 120 million yuan and nearly 100% occupancy.

Change records show that on December 2, Kunhua (Tianjin) Equity Investment Partnership (Limited Partnership) and Kun Yuanchenxing (Xiamen) Investment Management Consulting Co., Ltd. exited as shareholders of Yantai Zhifu Wanda Plaza, and Shanghai Wanda Ruichi Enterprise Management Co., Ltd. was added as the wholly owned controlling shareholder. Several senior executives also changed.

This was Wanda’s first redemption of a Wanda Plaza.

But the good times didn’t last—just one day later, it was transferred again.

On December 3, 2025, Yantai Zhifu Wanda Plaza Co., Ltd. underwent another business change, with Shanghai Wanda Ruichi Enterprise Management Co., Ltd. exiting as a shareholder, and Suzhou Lian Shang Jiuhao Commercial Management Co., Ltd. becoming the sole shareholder. The legal representative and key personnel also changed.

“Redemption followed by sale”—the sale of Zhuanqiao Wanda Plaza and the redemption of Zhifu Wanda Plaza are both microcosms of Wanda’s debt predicament:

As of February 2026, Wanda Group’s total liabilities are about 600 billion yuan; Wanda Commercial Management’s total liabilities are approximately 299 to 320 billion yuan, with interest-bearing debt around 141.2 billion yuan. The asset-liability ratio has decreased from a peak of 89.4% to 64.8%.

In terms of short-term debt, according to Wanda Commercial Management’s Q3 2025 financial report, its cash on hand is only 11.6 billion yuan, while interest-bearing debt due within one year reaches 30.269 billion yuan. The cash-to-short-term debt ratio is just 0.2, indicating a significant short-term funding gap. Coupled with annual interest expenses exceeding 10 billion yuan, cash flow remains under pressure.

Debt maturity dates are like the Damocles sword hanging overhead.

Therefore, Wanda has applied for debt extensions multiple times. In December 2025, Wanda Commercial Management sought consent from bondholders to extend the maturity of a $400 million bond due February 13, 2026, to February 13, 2028.

This bond has a high coupon rate of 11%. After extension, interest will still be paid, and there are four mandatory partial redemption clauses. In simple terms, it’s a request for “a two-year grace period, with interest paid in full, and some principal repaid in installments.”

Prior to this, in December 2024, Wanda successfully extended the maturity of another $400 million bond from January 20, 2025, to January 12, 2026.

On January 30, 2026, Wanda Commercial Management made another surprising move—issuing a $360 million senior secured US dollar bond with a coupon rate of 12.75%. The bond was oversubscribed 1.8 times. While this temporarily stabilized offshore debt, the financing cost is far above industry average, continuing to erode Wanda’s profits.

In summary, under heavy debt pressure, Wanda is playing a game of racing against time. The 2 billion yuan raised from the Zhuanqiao Wanda Plaza sale will likely be used to repay maturing public debt.

Can the shift to a light-asset model succeed?

After selling so many assets, what does Wanda still have?

According to public information, Wanda Group and Wang Jianlin’s remaining assets include a 40% stake in Dalian Xinda Meng, about 200 self-owned Wanda Plazas, approximately 522 managed Wanda Plazas, as well as Wanda Sports and Wanda Baby King, among others. Wanda Group still has 24 companies under active investment, with 15 holding more than 50% of shares.

Behind this dense asset disposal is, on one hand, Wanda’s response to debt pressure, and on the other, a firm push toward a light-asset model.

In 2015, Wang Jianlin first proposed a light-asset strategy. Since then, “breaking free from heavy assets and focusing on core operational capabilities” has become Wanda’s long-term development direction.

The recent sale of Zhuanqiao Wanda Plaza also deepens this “light-asset” strategy—selling property ownership while retaining operational management rights, shifting from “landlord” to “manager.” After divesting heavy assets, Wanda has also consolidated its core competitiveness.

First, Wanda Plaza’s brand influence and mature operational system. Although many plazas’ property rights have been sold, most projects still retain Wanda’s management rights and continue to use the Wanda Plaza brand.

This means Wanda still controls the most critical offline commercial resources—over 6,000 signed partners, including deeply integrated core tenants, forming a招商优势 where “Wanda opens, tenants follow,” and enabling strict tenant selection to prevent over-concentration of single brands.

Meanwhile, Wanda’s years of commercial operation experience and its proprietary “Huiyun” commercial information management system allow for detailed control over foot traffic, rent, and tenant operations. This is a key reason many capital investors are willing to acquire Wanda Plaza property rights but entrust Wanda with management.

Second, although asset sales continue, they do not involve all Wanda Plazas. Wanda has selected and retained a batch of high-quality core assets—about 150 plazas located in key first- and second-tier city centers, mostly in prime commercial districts, with high occupancy rates and stable rental income.

By the end of 2025, Wanda still operates over 500 Wanda Plazas across 228 cities nationwide, maintaining the industry’s largest scale.

Of course, the flip side is that the light-asset strategy is not without challenges.

On one hand, control dilution and brand management risks are increasing.

As capital partners like Taimei hold larger stakes, Wanda’s decision-making power diminishes. Some new investors have even initiated “de-Wanda-ization,” replacing management teams, which weakens Wanda’s brand premium and long-term revenue foundation.

On the other hand, debt risks remain unresolved, and the future is uncertain.

Although asset disposals have raised substantial funds, Wanda’s total liabilities remain large. If remaining assets depreciate or if sluggish consumption leads to higher vacancy rates and lower rent yields, further equity divestments or asset sales may be necessary, disrupting the pace of its light-asset transformation.

Looking back at 2026, Wanda’s debt crisis is a microcosm of the high-leverage model in the real estate industry. From reckless expansion to desperate survival, from heavy asset holdings to light asset operations, the transformation journey is fraught with difficulties.

The business world has never believed in tears. Whether Wanda can escape its predicament depends not only on Wang Jianlin’s resolve but also on market conditions and investor confidence.

Perhaps this is the cruel and fascinating reality of modern business: there are no eternal empires, only perpetual change.

Wanda’s story continues, and we are all witnesses to this era.