Oversubscribed by 17 times, backed by Solana—how much potential does the new project Avici have?

Author: zuccy

Original Title: The Case for Avici

Stablecoins and neobanks have been two of the most prominent themes in the past cycle. Solana ecosystem neobank project Avici is hoping to enter this narrative and aims to differentiate itself in the competition through a series of upcoming features.

Currently, Avici mainly provides credit card and virtual fiat (EUR and USD) bank account services. In addition to these core features, the project team also plans to launch unsecured loan and mortgage products, leveraging on-chain liquidity pools and introducing a user credit scoring system.

This test product allows users to generate cards and fiat accounts, which can be recharged using cryptocurrency.

Currently, Avici allows users to deposit crypto assets from Solana and many EVM networks.1 Avici is running a referral program where referees receive a 10% discount when purchasing a card, and referrers receive 20% of that 10% discount as a reward. Given that the product is still in the testing phase, this incentive program has generated strong usage data.

Avici has not yet publicly released user behavior and revenue statistics, but they have shared some data snapshots in previous community update posts.

As of November 5, 2025, Avici had over 8,290 monthly active users (MAUs) and 5,700 activated cards.

Although features are still limited, they have successfully built an active user base. In the November update, they noted that the total spending for the past month was about $600,000, involving 17,400 transactions. Since inception, Avici has recorded a total spending of $1.6 million and $2.1 million in credit creation. Credit creation refers to credit lines collateralized by deposited USDC. Despite sparse data, both total spending and total credit creation showed significant growth during the community update period. As shown in normalized charts and tables, these two metrics grew by about 23% and 50%, respectively, between update cycles. Meanwhile, transaction volume also increased, but to a lesser extent, indicating a rise in average spend per transaction.

Economic Model

Avici currently relies on three main revenue streams: card sales, interchange revenue, and deposit/withdrawal fees.

Users can choose between two different types of credit cards (Platinum or Signature) for physical or virtual cards. Each card comes with benefits as per those provided by Visa. Avici estimates interchange revenue between 1.5% and 2%. Most of this rate is not captured by Avici but by the card service provider.

Finally, Avici charges a one-time fee for creating virtual bank accounts and a fee for each deposit/withdrawal transaction. Avici uses Nimbus LLC dba Third National as its card-issuing partner. Their original virtual bank account partner was Bridge (a Stripe company), but they have recently switched to a new partner. The new partner has not yet been publicly disclosed.

The current revenue sources and corresponding values are shown in the table.

It is estimated that, except for interchange revenue and deposit/withdrawal fees, Avici captures most of the revenue from all other sources. In the EU, the interchange fee cap for credit cards is 0.3%, while in the US it averages 2%. Based on this, it’s safe to say that Avici captures about one-third of the interchange revenue. The deposit/withdrawal fee is shown as 0.8%, but their partner’s website lists it at about 1%. Avici and its partner have likely agreed on a lower fee, but since this is not public, it is assumed Avici captures little revenue here.

In the November update, Avici’s founders stated that revenue for October reached $30,000. This translates to about $5.3 in revenue per card activation (5,708 cards activated), or $3.6 per monthly active user (8,290 MAUs). Even assuming all card activations are the lower-priced Platinum type and 90% of customers choose the lower-priced virtual card, this still means about $14 in revenue per card activation. Without more data, it is difficult to determine the actual commission ratio.

As more features are added to the app, Avici hopes to add more revenue streams to its business. These include business accounts, wallet swap fees, private transaction fees, new card type fees, a share of yield from savings and mortgage vaults, and monetization of its credit scoring infrastructure.

Tokenomics

Avici previously conducted an initial token offering (ICO) via MetaDAO, planning to sell 10 million $AVICI tokens to raise $2 million. This sale was ultimately oversubscribed by about 17x, and the fundraising cap was raised to $3.5 million.

In addition to the tokens sold, another 2.9 million tokens are reserved for providing liquidity.

Thus, the initial circulating supply of the token is 12.9 million. At the token generation event (TGE), this implies a price of $0.35 per token and a fully diluted valuation (FDV) of $4.515 million.

No tokens were allocated to the project team, who instead chose to receive only a $100,000 monthly team stipend. Any adjustment to this stipend or any expenditures must be approved via futarchy (prediction market-based governance) vote on MetaDAO. If additional tokens need to be issued for the team or other purposes in the future, a similar governance process via futarchy is required.

Since the $AVICI ICO was conducted through MetaDAO, Avici’s intellectual property is wholly owned by the project entity. This arrangement ensures that project funds cannot be diverted using legal loopholes around intellectual property.

As of December 3, Avici’s treasury held $2.6 million, sufficient for more than two years of operations at current spending limits. As the business expands and more talent is hired, the monthly stipend is expected to increase, and the DAO community will likely view such increases as positive developments and approve them.

Competitive Landscape and Market Positioning

The neobank sector is highly competitive, dominated by a few companies. These include Revolut, Monzo, Nubank, SoFi, N26, and Wise. These neobanks all have multi-billion dollar valuations and offer a variety of services from cards to brokerage accounts, mortgages, and personal loan credit lines.

In the crypto neobank space, companies like Holyheld, Gnosis, EtherFi, Kast, Payy, and UR are market leaders. These projects at least offer self-custody cards that can be topped up with wallet balances. However, unlike their traditional counterparts, crypto neobanks cannot offer credit lines due to a lack of linkage between users’ crypto assets and the kind of creditworthiness data derived from employment and payment history.

Avici’s vision is to bring crypto neobanks closer to traditional neobanks that can offer credit lines. They believe the way forward is to use zero-knowledge (ZK) data to compute customer trust scores and to access decentralized capital pools for mortgages and business loans. In their documentation, they outline:

“Most neobanks cannot offer traditional business loans or credit lines without relying on centralized funding pools. That’s why, when you need a $100,000–$300,000 mortgage to buy a house, you still walk into a big bank instead of the neobank you use every day.”

Avici envisions a future where crypto users rely on them for daily banking services and believes the only way to achieve this is to enable users to access the full suite of services offered by traditional banks. This may be Avici’s most differentiated business model factor. In a recent product preview, Avici showcased a video of obtaining a mortgage on their platform using a ZK trust score, which relies on the customer’s FICO score or Plaid account. This workflow is shown in the following model diagram:

If Avici can deliver on these promises and monetize its ZK trust scoring SDK, it will add more lucrative revenue streams to its business.

Market Entry Strategy and Integration

Neobanks typically target underserved populations as their market entry strategy, allowing them to build a user base with high retention rates. In the November 5 update, Avici mentioned that their spending retention rate is about 70%. This is about 12% lower than the average for the banking sector and 20% lower than the digital banking sector average. However, it’s reasonable to assume Avici’s data is skewed lower due to test purchases by customers trying out the product. This metric needs further monitoring to observe where it stabilizes.

Avici plans to focus on its existing consumers and on underserved regions. In their official documentation, Avici states they want to “expand market entry strategies in regions where people have wealth but still must pay 20–25% APY to get a mortgage.” They outline the need for distribution before launching undercollateralized loans, which justifies their decision to focus on card/neobank business strategies first.

Risks

Partners

As mentioned, Avici’s cards are issued by Nimbus LLC dba Third National. Third National holds a money transmitter license issued by the Puerto Rico Office of the Commissioner of Financial Institutions. BIN records show Nimbus LLC has four BINs related to Visa card issuance. There is less information about deposit/withdrawal and virtual bank account partners, as this partnership has not been publicly disclosed at the time of writing. However, the partner is a stablecoin infrastructure company recently acquired by a major crypto payments company.

Although both partners appear legitimate and trustworthy, there is a long history of fintech companies failing due to partner risk. The bankruptcy of Synapse caused many fintech companies relying on them for deposit management to collapse, leading to ongoing legal issues. Fintechs relying on Synapse, like Yotta, Juno, and Copper, saw customer deposits disappear and had to shut down or pivot to new business models. Thus, as Avici continues to expand, its partners represent a significant potential risk.

Regulation and Tax

Regulatory compliance is critical for fintech companies. Avici conducts digital KYC verification when users select their card and virtual bank account plans. However, bypassing these systems is not impossible—selling KYC’d accounts for trivial amounts is common, especially in crypto. If such problems become public and attract regulatory enforcement, small companies like Avici would likely be unable to withstand the impact.

Their mortgage/loan services also bring a host of new regulatory complexities. These services must comply with consumer lending laws and data privacy laws applicable to their ZK trust scoring services. Compliance expenses account for about 20% of revenue for EMEA financial companies, and most companies’ compliance spending increases year-on-year. As more product services are added to Avici’s suite, they will likely need to use governance votes to tap their treasury for compliance and legal expenses.

Beyond compliance, illegal activities conducted through their platform, such as tax evasion, will inevitably occur. Although the current US administration has shown little enforcement against crypto, blatant illegal activity poses a major risk to Avici.

Complexity

In crypto history, there have been countless iterations of undercollateralized lending, but none have successfully served individuals. Protocols like Wildcat Finance and Maple Finance found some product-market fit (PMF) by offering undercollateralized loans to vetted and trusted crypto institutions, but even these loans experienced defaults due to poor risk management. On the individual side, 3Jane is exploring using traditional credit metrics to offer undercollateralized loans, but its long-term viability remains to be seen. Avici is attempting to enter a field with little historical success. If Avici fails to deliver on its loan service promises, it becomes just another crypto neobank offering cards and virtual fiat accounts.

Investment Thesis

Since its TGE price of $0.35, $AVICI has appreciated about 20-fold and is currently trading at around $7.06 (about $91 million FDV). Based on the October revenue figure of $30,000, if it cannot quickly roll out its lending services, it is unclear whether its current economic model is viable. However, regulatory barriers are likely to prevent such rapid rollout. Moreover, beyond speculation, the token’s role is still unclear. They may choose to buy back tokens with future revenue to share some profits with holders, but this is just speculation.

The crypto neobank sector has already found clear product-market fit, with total spending exploding, as shown in the chart below:

At minimum, Avici is a crypto neobank product offering cards and virtual fiat bank accounts. The sector lacks tools for individuals to speculate on growth.

Some products like Solayer Pay, Gnosis, and EtherFi have liquid tradable tokens. However, most are not pure-play neobanks but bundle other products into their service stack. Nonetheless, their valuations are an order of magnitude higher than Avici ($LAYER (Solayer) FDV is about $200 million, $GNO (Gnosis) FDV is about $390 million, and $ETHFI (EtherFi) FDV is about $880 million).

Although still early, from a valuation perspective, Avici currently appears relatively undervalued. However, the market still lacks a clear understanding of the token value accrual logic.

Once this becomes clear and more operational metrics are published, I believe Avici at its current valuation ($90–100 million) or slightly higher will be a buy to watch. Key metrics to monitor include average user spend and monthly active user count.

If growth continues and Avici can launch its loan product by Q2 2026 (even at limited scale), its valuation could quickly catch up. Their end vision is ambitious, and if realized, Avici will stand out among crypto neobanks.