Today, I donât plan to dive too deep into technical aspects. Instead, I want to discuss a social issue we face in the crypto space. The title of this talk is âSocial Consensus and Self-Regulation.â Let me start by asking: has anyone here heard of the âLemon Problemâ? Does this term sound familiar?
Alright, not too many people, not really.
In American slang, a âlemonâ refers to an unreliable carâone that you didnât know was unreliable beforehand. Iâm not entirely sure about the origin of this term, but thatâs what âlemonâ means.
On the other hand, a good, reliable car is called a âpeach.â I actually didnât know this myself until I looked it upâkind of a cute contrast.
The Lemon Problem is essentially an issue faced by used car dealerships. When you go to a used car market, it often feels a little sketchy because you donât know whether youâre buying a âpeachâ or a âlemon.â This is also a major problem in the crypto industry todayâeverything may look like a âpeach,â but in reality, many protocols turn out to be âlemons.â
So when you buy a car or use a crypto protocol, thereâs always a certain probability that itâs a âpeachâ and a certain probability that itâs a âlemon.â The question is: How much are you willing to pay for it? What is the expected valueâthe weighted average priceâyouâd be willing to pay for something that could either be a âpeachâ or a âlemonâ?
The price youâre willing to pay essentially follows a weighted average concept. Thereâs a certain probability that itâs a âlemon,â multiplied by the value of a âlemon.â Thereâs a certain probability that itâs a âpeach,â multiplied by the value of a âpeach.â
Intuitively, you might think that the price youâd be willing to pay falls somewhere between what youâd pay if you knew for sure it was a âpeachâ and what youâd pay if you knew it was a âlemon.â But why is this a weird dynamic? Why are we even talking about fruit?
So what incentives does this have for used car dealers? What is your incentive if you know that everyone will pay a price between a peach and a lemon?
Your incentive is to only sell lemons, right? If people are willing to pay more than a âlemonâ is actually worth, you have no reason to sell âpeaches.â You can just sell âlemonsâ to them and profit.
This is essentially what we call a scam.
I want to pause here because this is a huge issue in the crypto industry todayâthe Lemon Problem.
Currently, in crypto, because of this Lemon Problem, the probability of finding a âpeachâ has actually gone down. Fewer people are willing to build âpeachesâ because they are expensive to produce, while âlemonâ dealers flood the market. They see an opportunity: âWow, I can just sell âlemonsâ to people who are willing to pay more than they are worth because they mistakenly believe theyâre buying âpeaches.ââ As a result, users are losing confidence and participating less in the ecosystem, which is completely understandable.
At this point, I can already hear some of youâor at least an imaginary criticâsaying:
âThis is just the price of permissionless systems. We have to accept the good with the bad. Itâs like the â30% crypto discountââyou just have to deal with it.â
But the Lemon Problem is not a one-time costâitâs a death spiral.
When trust declines, it becomes harder for âpeachesâ to outperform âlemons.â Eventually, âpeachesâ exit the market, and all that remains are âlemonsââwhich is not a good place to be.
Thatâs why we need to find ways to help consumers identify âlemonsâ. Because if we donât do it, Gary willâand heâs already working hard on it. This is why I advocate that if we want to uphold the spirit of innovation in crypto while addressing the Lemon Problem, we need some form of self-regulation.
Now, letâs compare this to industries that have successfully tackled similar issuesâthis might be a controversial discussion.
Okay, what am I talking about?
So am I saying that the crypto space is a casino?
No, Iâm saying the crypto industry is actually worse than a casino.
At the very least, we need to be as good as a casino. If crypto is going to succeed, we need to adopt the things that casinos do well.
We need to at least do what casinos do well,
I think itâs worth a look and thatâs what Iâm going to say next.
Casinos are known for their emphasis on fairness and security. They actively promote this. Why do they do this? They went to great lengths to prove that the casino was not rigged, except of course the way it was clearly rigged.
Let me give you a few examples, this is an automatic card shuffler.
Well, why would they do that? Why did they use this instead of having the dealer deal the cards manually?
Because they want to prove to you that youâre not being cheatedâat least, not in any way beyond the built-in house edge. They want to show you verifiable randomness.
They ban cheaters and share cheater information with other casinos. Why are they willing to gang up on cheaters? If I were at the Flamingo Casino (a casino in Las Vegas) and I discovered a cheater, why would I share this information with the winner?
Casinos use precision dice calipers to ensure that dice weight is evenly distributed. All of these measures exist to convince consumers that they are not being scammed. You may be playing against the odds, but at least the game itself is fair.
The government and casinos actually invest together in making casinos safe. People forget that casinos are highly legal and rapidly growing. Ethereum is projected to generate $2 billion in fees this yearâmeanwhile, the global casino industry is on track to reach $300 billion in revenue.
Marketing security is something casinos do exceptionally well in collaboration with governments. They persuade regulators that making casinos safe benefits everyone.
Okay, how does this work? This is a virtuous cycle, more trust equals more investment in fairness and security.
And we need to achieve this in a decentralized way. One thing we all knowâyet I havenât heard mentioned even once this weekâis a three-letter word: FTX. Nobody is talking about it. We love to pretend it was just a bad dream. But in reality, bad actors completely eroded trust in the entire ecosystemânot just among their victims, but for everyone.
We have the technology to prove security and legitimacyâwe just need to implement it at the social layer. So, letâs give this weekâs obligatory mentionâzero-knowledge (ZK), right? Itâs a term weâre all familiar with.
We have the ability to prove integrityâto verify identity, reputation, and computational correctness.
The problem is not technology, we keep attending these conferences, constantly talking about technical solutionsâbut part of the real issue lies in social consensus and ideology.
We already have the capability to create new forms of social consensus that focus on protecting applications and users. We need to accept that this is something we must doâwe need to self-regulate before others step in to regulate us.
Right now, we tend to take an extreme ideological stanceâeither completely permissionless or entirely permissioned. Itâs often seen as black or white, all or nothing.
But in reality, there is a broad spectrum of social consensus between these two extremes.
Let me give you an example of what ZK and ASIC research could unlockâsomething that challenges traditional ideological thinking. Imagine a liquidity pool where only token holders who can prove the legitimacy of their funds (through a third-party verification system) are allowed to participate. This model can be both permissionless and permissioned at the same time. I can create a pool with these rules, and you have the freedom to decide whether or not to participate.
This introduces the idea of voluntary paternalismâwhere a shared social consensus within a given community (like the people in this room) decides on the rules for safe operation, while users still retain the ability to choose whether they engage with it. Itâs not a binary, black-or-white choice where any form of permissionâwhether social or democraticâis deemed unacceptable.
Another example is the concept of decentralized âcleaningâ providers, something that Vitalik and our co-founder Zach Williamson have been exploring. This model introduces a social graph where individuals verify the legitimacy of funds and transactions. Users can observe behaviors and collectively decide, âThis is not something we want to be associated with.â This is fundamentally different from centralization and radically different from censorship. Instead, it represents a democratic form of social consensus, where we, as a community, decide what behaviors we will not tolerate within our ecosystem.
The goal here is not to restrict freedom, but to give users more choices in expressing their preferences across different protocol designs.
So, ZK enables permissionless functionality at the base layer, while at the application layer, it allows for permissioned social consensus.
There are already many examples of this in actionâdiscussions around proof of reserves, anti-phishing mechanisms, opt-in compliance pools, and legitimacy proofs for funds.
But ultimately, what weâre saying is: We need to turn zachXBT into ZKâwe need to replace reliance on trust and centralized compliance with mathematical proofs and social consensus.
To summarize, we need ZK to enable three major advancements:
First, we need self-regulation and compliance while preserving user choice. As a community and an ecosystem, we havenât had a real conversation about self-regulation. Weâve mostly just been hoping and praying that regulators wonât notice us.
But Web3 will not succeed if we allow this to continue. We need to proveâto both regulators and usersâthat we take care of each other and that we take care of our users.
Freedom through choice, not ideology. We shouldnât force ideology onto users. Instead, letâs give them the choice to decide where they want to participate. Thatâs what this space is ultimately aboutâfreedom and autonomy.
Finally, we need to improve security, we need to make it reliable, and we need to make crypto a necessity rather than an option. We forget that governments are at least supposedly made up of voters, why are Uber and Airbnb once illegal and now legal? Because someone walked up to the steps of Congress and said, âYou canât take my Uber away from me until Iâm dead,â and someone did that, personally, I donât know if you remember this.
One way we can make crypto a necessity and woven into the fabric of our economic lives is by ensuring it is reliable and secure, and that we support our users.
This is how we turn lemons into peaches.
This edition features a video from BlueYard Capital published on YouTube: âJon Wu (Aztec) @ If Web3 is to Work⊠A BlueYard Conversationâ
Original video link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o17GnPJXxgU&t=244s
Today, I donât plan to dive too deep into technical aspects. Instead, I want to discuss a social issue we face in the crypto space. The title of this talk is âSocial Consensus and Self-Regulation.â Let me start by asking: has anyone here heard of the âLemon Problemâ? Does this term sound familiar?
Alright, not too many people, not really.
In American slang, a âlemonâ refers to an unreliable carâone that you didnât know was unreliable beforehand. Iâm not entirely sure about the origin of this term, but thatâs what âlemonâ means.
On the other hand, a good, reliable car is called a âpeach.â I actually didnât know this myself until I looked it upâkind of a cute contrast.
The Lemon Problem is essentially an issue faced by used car dealerships. When you go to a used car market, it often feels a little sketchy because you donât know whether youâre buying a âpeachâ or a âlemon.â This is also a major problem in the crypto industry todayâeverything may look like a âpeach,â but in reality, many protocols turn out to be âlemons.â
So when you buy a car or use a crypto protocol, thereâs always a certain probability that itâs a âpeachâ and a certain probability that itâs a âlemon.â The question is: How much are you willing to pay for it? What is the expected valueâthe weighted average priceâyouâd be willing to pay for something that could either be a âpeachâ or a âlemonâ?
The price youâre willing to pay essentially follows a weighted average concept. Thereâs a certain probability that itâs a âlemon,â multiplied by the value of a âlemon.â Thereâs a certain probability that itâs a âpeach,â multiplied by the value of a âpeach.â
Intuitively, you might think that the price youâd be willing to pay falls somewhere between what youâd pay if you knew for sure it was a âpeachâ and what youâd pay if you knew it was a âlemon.â But why is this a weird dynamic? Why are we even talking about fruit?
So what incentives does this have for used car dealers? What is your incentive if you know that everyone will pay a price between a peach and a lemon?
Your incentive is to only sell lemons, right? If people are willing to pay more than a âlemonâ is actually worth, you have no reason to sell âpeaches.â You can just sell âlemonsâ to them and profit.
This is essentially what we call a scam.
I want to pause here because this is a huge issue in the crypto industry todayâthe Lemon Problem.
Currently, in crypto, because of this Lemon Problem, the probability of finding a âpeachâ has actually gone down. Fewer people are willing to build âpeachesâ because they are expensive to produce, while âlemonâ dealers flood the market. They see an opportunity: âWow, I can just sell âlemonsâ to people who are willing to pay more than they are worth because they mistakenly believe theyâre buying âpeaches.ââ As a result, users are losing confidence and participating less in the ecosystem, which is completely understandable.
At this point, I can already hear some of youâor at least an imaginary criticâsaying:
âThis is just the price of permissionless systems. We have to accept the good with the bad. Itâs like the â30% crypto discountââyou just have to deal with it.â
But the Lemon Problem is not a one-time costâitâs a death spiral.
When trust declines, it becomes harder for âpeachesâ to outperform âlemons.â Eventually, âpeachesâ exit the market, and all that remains are âlemonsââwhich is not a good place to be.
Thatâs why we need to find ways to help consumers identify âlemonsâ. Because if we donât do it, Gary willâand heâs already working hard on it. This is why I advocate that if we want to uphold the spirit of innovation in crypto while addressing the Lemon Problem, we need some form of self-regulation.
Now, letâs compare this to industries that have successfully tackled similar issuesâthis might be a controversial discussion.
Okay, what am I talking about?
So am I saying that the crypto space is a casino?
No, Iâm saying the crypto industry is actually worse than a casino.
At the very least, we need to be as good as a casino. If crypto is going to succeed, we need to adopt the things that casinos do well.
We need to at least do what casinos do well,
I think itâs worth a look and thatâs what Iâm going to say next.
Casinos are known for their emphasis on fairness and security. They actively promote this. Why do they do this? They went to great lengths to prove that the casino was not rigged, except of course the way it was clearly rigged.
Let me give you a few examples, this is an automatic card shuffler.
Well, why would they do that? Why did they use this instead of having the dealer deal the cards manually?
Because they want to prove to you that youâre not being cheatedâat least, not in any way beyond the built-in house edge. They want to show you verifiable randomness.
They ban cheaters and share cheater information with other casinos. Why are they willing to gang up on cheaters? If I were at the Flamingo Casino (a casino in Las Vegas) and I discovered a cheater, why would I share this information with the winner?
Casinos use precision dice calipers to ensure that dice weight is evenly distributed. All of these measures exist to convince consumers that they are not being scammed. You may be playing against the odds, but at least the game itself is fair.
The government and casinos actually invest together in making casinos safe. People forget that casinos are highly legal and rapidly growing. Ethereum is projected to generate $2 billion in fees this yearâmeanwhile, the global casino industry is on track to reach $300 billion in revenue.
Marketing security is something casinos do exceptionally well in collaboration with governments. They persuade regulators that making casinos safe benefits everyone.
Okay, how does this work? This is a virtuous cycle, more trust equals more investment in fairness and security.
And we need to achieve this in a decentralized way. One thing we all knowâyet I havenât heard mentioned even once this weekâis a three-letter word: FTX. Nobody is talking about it. We love to pretend it was just a bad dream. But in reality, bad actors completely eroded trust in the entire ecosystemânot just among their victims, but for everyone.
We have the technology to prove security and legitimacyâwe just need to implement it at the social layer. So, letâs give this weekâs obligatory mentionâzero-knowledge (ZK), right? Itâs a term weâre all familiar with.
We have the ability to prove integrityâto verify identity, reputation, and computational correctness.
The problem is not technology, we keep attending these conferences, constantly talking about technical solutionsâbut part of the real issue lies in social consensus and ideology.
We already have the capability to create new forms of social consensus that focus on protecting applications and users. We need to accept that this is something we must doâwe need to self-regulate before others step in to regulate us.
Right now, we tend to take an extreme ideological stanceâeither completely permissionless or entirely permissioned. Itâs often seen as black or white, all or nothing.
But in reality, there is a broad spectrum of social consensus between these two extremes.
Let me give you an example of what ZK and ASIC research could unlockâsomething that challenges traditional ideological thinking. Imagine a liquidity pool where only token holders who can prove the legitimacy of their funds (through a third-party verification system) are allowed to participate. This model can be both permissionless and permissioned at the same time. I can create a pool with these rules, and you have the freedom to decide whether or not to participate.
This introduces the idea of voluntary paternalismâwhere a shared social consensus within a given community (like the people in this room) decides on the rules for safe operation, while users still retain the ability to choose whether they engage with it. Itâs not a binary, black-or-white choice where any form of permissionâwhether social or democraticâis deemed unacceptable.
Another example is the concept of decentralized âcleaningâ providers, something that Vitalik and our co-founder Zach Williamson have been exploring. This model introduces a social graph where individuals verify the legitimacy of funds and transactions. Users can observe behaviors and collectively decide, âThis is not something we want to be associated with.â This is fundamentally different from centralization and radically different from censorship. Instead, it represents a democratic form of social consensus, where we, as a community, decide what behaviors we will not tolerate within our ecosystem.
The goal here is not to restrict freedom, but to give users more choices in expressing their preferences across different protocol designs.
So, ZK enables permissionless functionality at the base layer, while at the application layer, it allows for permissioned social consensus.
There are already many examples of this in actionâdiscussions around proof of reserves, anti-phishing mechanisms, opt-in compliance pools, and legitimacy proofs for funds.
But ultimately, what weâre saying is: We need to turn zachXBT into ZKâwe need to replace reliance on trust and centralized compliance with mathematical proofs and social consensus.
To summarize, we need ZK to enable three major advancements:
First, we need self-regulation and compliance while preserving user choice. As a community and an ecosystem, we havenât had a real conversation about self-regulation. Weâve mostly just been hoping and praying that regulators wonât notice us.
But Web3 will not succeed if we allow this to continue. We need to proveâto both regulators and usersâthat we take care of each other and that we take care of our users.
Freedom through choice, not ideology. We shouldnât force ideology onto users. Instead, letâs give them the choice to decide where they want to participate. Thatâs what this space is ultimately aboutâfreedom and autonomy.
Finally, we need to improve security, we need to make it reliable, and we need to make crypto a necessity rather than an option. We forget that governments are at least supposedly made up of voters, why are Uber and Airbnb once illegal and now legal? Because someone walked up to the steps of Congress and said, âYou canât take my Uber away from me until Iâm dead,â and someone did that, personally, I donât know if you remember this.
One way we can make crypto a necessity and woven into the fabric of our economic lives is by ensuring it is reliable and secure, and that we support our users.
This is how we turn lemons into peaches.
This edition features a video from BlueYard Capital published on YouTube: âJon Wu (Aztec) @ If Web3 is to Work⊠A BlueYard Conversationâ
Original video link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o17GnPJXxgU&t=244s